Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1995

The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital
Signs?
Harry W. Arthurs
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, harthurs@osgoode.yorku.ca

Source Publication:
Alberta Law Review. Volume 33, Number 4 (1995), p. 800-809.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Legal Profession Commons

Recommended Citation
Arthurs, Harry W. "The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?" Alberta Law
Review 33.4 (1995): 800-809.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW
ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXXIII, NO. 4 1995]
[VOL. XXXIII, NO. 4 1995]

THE DEAD PARROT: DOES PROFESSIONAL
SELF-REGULATION EXHIBIT VITAL SIGNS?
H.W. ARTHURS"
Seif-governance of the legal profession, and the
promulgation and enforcement of a code of
professional conduct are usually justified by
arguments from principle, practicality and past
practice. None of these can be sustained However,
if professional self-governance were replaced by
governmental orjudicial regulation,the operational
norms of professional conduct - the way lawyers
actually behave - would likely not change very
much. In fact, formal regulation, by whatever
means, is not a major determinant of conduct that
can be characterized as unethical. Rather, such
conduct is largely determined by the personal
characteristics of the individual lawyer, the
professional circumstances of her or his practice,
and especially the "ethical economy" of the
profession. The "ethicaleconomy" encompasses the
social, political, economic and cultural forces,
inside and outside the profession, which help to
define which conduct will be treated as deviant or
unethical and to identify who will be sanctionedfor
engaging in such conduct.

L 'auto-gestion du barreau, la promulgation et le
respect d'un code de conduite professionnelle, se
justife en giniralpar des arguments invoquant les
principes, des impdratifs pratiques et la pratique
passde. Aucun d eux ne peut 6tre fond&. Cependant,
si P'auto-gestionprofessionnelle 9tait remplacde par
un rdglement judiciaire ou gouvernemental, les
normesfonctionnelles de conduite professionnelle la fa(on dont les avocats se conduisent
vdritablement - changeraient probablement trds
peu. En fait, tout rdglement officiel, quel qu 'il soit,
ne permet pas vraiment de determiner les conduites
qualifiables de contraire 6 I'thique. En fail, une
telle conduite se d~termine largement par les
caractdristiquespersonnelles de chaque membre du
barreau, les circonstances de sa pratique et surtout
I'e(dconomie dthiquev de la profession. Cette
6conomie englobe des forces sociales, politiques,
dconomiques et culturelles, internes et externes, qui
aident t definir les conduites aberrantes ou
contraires d l'dthique et d reconnaftre qui sera
passible de sanction.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.

II.
III.

. .................................. 800
THE DETERMINANTS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
THE ETHICAL ECONOMY OF THE PROFESSION ......... 802
CONCLUSION ..................................... 808
INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION
Some of you will know the famous Monty Python skit in which a dissatisfied
customer attempts to return a parrot to a pet shop on the relatively straightforward
ground that it was dead when he bought it half an hour earlier. The clerk in the pet
shop first tries evasive tactics: "look at its plumage," he says. Then he confronts the
issue head on: "this parrot," he says, "is not dead; it's resting; it's shagged out after a
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long squawk, it's kipping on its back." A vigorous debate ensues which - for Python
aficionados - sounds very much like the debate over whether self-governance and
codes of professional conduct are essential features of professional regulation.
We have all been through this debate; some of us can recite it with the same relish
as we recite the dead parrot skit. First, there is the argument from principle: selfgoverning professions are needed to defend society against the all-pervasive power of
the state. An autonomous bar, as the argument runs, is a sort of extrusion of an
independent judiciary, which, in turn, is an indispensable adjunct of the rule of law.
Secondly, there is the argument from practicality: professions must be self-governing
because they alone understand what their members need to know, how they ought to
behave, what constitutes deviant conduct, and which sanctions ought to be imposed
when. And thirdly, there is the argument from past practice: professions ought to be
self-governing because they have always been self-governing, as a result of which selfgovernance has become the distinguishing characteristic of a profession, as opposed to
a "mere" trade or business.
I am unsure of the collective noun for these parrots, so I will have to administer last
rites to each of them individually.
First, the argument from principle: there are all sorts of liberal, pluralistic
democracies - Sweden comes to mind immediately - where the bar is not selfgoverning; there have been many times in our own Anglo-Canadian history when the
bar and the bench were much more closely aligned with the forces of repression than
with those of freedom; and some of our finest judges have come not from the selfgoverning wing of the profession, but from employment in government or universities.
Practice does not confirm the principle.
Secondly, the argument from practicality: it is certainly true that lawyers know more
about how law is practiced than anyone else; it is even arguable that this knowledge
qualifies them to enforce standards of practice. But it does not follow that, because the
profession has the power and the knowledge to regulate effectively, it will do so. The
evidence is to the contrary: law societies have exhibited an invincible repugnance to the
idea that they should use their knowledge and power to discipline incompetent lawyers,
the very group that professional self-government is designed to suppress. The argument
from practicality, I am afraid, will persuade no one but ourselves.
And finally, we come to the argument from precedent: since the bar and other
professions have "always" been self-governing, any dilution of self-governance
undermines their claim to be a profession. We are because we are because we are. The
argument is circular: geometrically perfect but not historically perfect. What an
American sociologist referred to as "the professionalization of almost everyone" is a
process which began in the early nineteenth century, and continues unabated. In effect,
occupational groups for almost two hundred years have been inflating their claims to
knowledge in order to assert their "right" to respect and autonomy, to bid up the value
of their intellectual and cultural capital, to control the market for their services and to
enhance their financial and psychological rewards.
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Over the long haul, the bar has succeeded more often than not in defending its
monopoly despite the problematic and precarious nature of its knowledge base.
Nonetheless, there has been nothing fixed about the boundaries of our knowledge, the
limits of our monopoly, or the autonomous character of our institutions of governance.
Over time, each has changed considerably. Thus, to insist at any given moment that a
particular constellation of institutional arrangements describes a profession - or even
our profession - is to confuse description with prescription.
At a minimum, then, heroic measures - and possibly divine intervention - will be
needed to breathe life into these parrots. We are going to have to come up with better
arguments if we want to make the case that self-governance is essential to the
maintenance of high professional standards.
II. THE DETERMINANTS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
THE ETHICAL ECONOMY OF THE PROFESSION
Let me now approach the issues the other way 'round. Would it really matter if we
were to abandon the idea of professional self-regulation and hand over powers of
discipline and disbarment to the courts or a regulatory agency? Not very much at all,
I would argue. Essentially, much of what now passes for norms of professional conduct
is a dead letter anyway, in terms of enforcement. Many, if not most, of the chapters of
the Canadian Bar Association ("CBA") Code' are not in fact used to disbar or
discipline lawyers. I personally would be pleased to hear that someone had been
suspended for not representing clients resolutely, not adhering to high standards in the
discharge of public office or not trying to improve the administration of justice. I would
be delighted to know that someone who was discourteous to members of the profession
or derelict in his or her duty to make legal services available to the public had attracted
professional censure. But alas, such professional norms are violated with virtual
impunity.
Essentially, lawyers in Canada are subject to serious discipline for just four reasons:
because they have been guilty of theft, fraud, forgery or other some other criminal
offence; because they have violated a fiduciary duty imposed on them by law; because
they are unable to carry on their practices due to physical or mental disability or serious
addiction; or because they have failed to respond to inquiries from their governing
body.
Suppose there were no system of professional discipline: how would we handle these
difficult matters? The first category - criminal fraud and related matters - is by far
the most important statistically; all such matters could be, and now generally are,
handled by courts of criminal jurisdiction. The second category - breaches of fiduciary
duty - could likewise be competently handled by courts of civil jurisdiction. The
steady but modest stream of cases involving personal and professional disability, I
accept, would have to be handled in a specialized forum of some kind - if not the
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Law Society, then a body invented for the purpose. And as for the remaining,
somewhat Orwellian, offence of failing to cooperate with the Law Society, perhaps we
could get along without it.
Let me sum up my argument thus far in the form of two propositions: (1) much of
the normative content of our Code of Professional Conduct never becomes operational
because no regulatory effort is invested in its enforcement, and (2) much of what
actually is operational in the Code could be enforced otherwise than by self-governing
professional bodies. To these two propositions, I am now going to add a third: it does
not matter very much who has the power to regulate the professions because, in fact,
regulation is not a major determinant of professional conduct.
I want to acknowledge immediately that this proposition sits right in the middle of
an ongoing emotional public debate about the use of penal sanctions to fight crime,
sexism or pollution. Saying that fraud by lawyers is deterred by the Code of
Professional Conduct and the risk of disbarment is like saying that Criminal Code
amendments and lengthy jail terms will reduce the incidence of child abuse and armed
robbery. If you believe one statement, you will believe the other; I am deeply agnostic
about both.
Obviously, some importance does attach to the existence of a professional code
backed, at least in theory, by serious sanctions. But I do not believe that prospective
violaters embark upon a careful scrutiny of the code or a calculus of possible
consequences before deciding to commit fraud or to tender perjured evidence.
To the contrary: if you want to know who is likely to misbehave, how and why, if
you want to know how to prevent misbehaviour, if you want to know which standards
of professional behaviour will be treated as worth enforcing and which will be ignored,
there is little point in reading the Code of Professional Conduct or the reports of
discipline proceedings. Professional conduct is, I believe, shaped by three important
factors - the personal characteristics of the lawyer, the professional circumstances of
his or her practice and the ethical economy of the profession. These parrots, I want to
suggest, are very much in the land of the living. Let me invite each of them to squawk
in turn.
People arrive at the study of law, and then at the practice of law, with intellectual
endowments, psychological predispositions, family backgrounds, class, gender, racial
and ethnic characteristics, educations, social experiences, coping skills, debts, ambitions
and values. All of these qualities shape their behaviour as lawyers, just as they shape
their behaviour in the rest of their lives.
Some of these same qualities also help to shape the circumstances in which they will
practice. Generally speaking, aggressive people with superior intellectual skills who
come from advantaged social backgrounds have a much better chance of practicing in
elite firms than, say, those who are less ambitious, have poorer academic records or are
black or female. Practicing in an elite firm, in turn, means that you will experience
different pressures, confront different ethical concerns and be subject to a different kind
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of surveillance than, say, someone who practices in a suburban strip mall, a small town
or a government department.
I do not want to leave the impression that lawyers in particular types of practices or
locales are branded with a mark of original sin. However, the fact is that the legal
profession, like the larger society it serves, is pretty highly stratified. Working
conditions, support staff, collegial relations, control systems, capital investment,
financial rewards, psychic pressures, public acclaim and personal satisfactions vary
across sectors of the profession and over time. Ethical concerns likewise vary. Criminal
lawyers seldom handle trust funds; commercial lawyers seldom deal in perjured
testimony; tax counsel seldom find themselves in a conflict of interest; and
conveyancers are seldom caught committing fraud at the top of the real estate market.
Finally, what I have elsewhere called the "ethical economy" of the legal profession
explains which kinds of ethical concerns attract the vigilance of the Law Society, which
are allowed to become a dead letter, and consequently, who is likely to find themselves
in what kind of trouble.
For example, the proletariat of the profession - general practitioners - operate on
thin profit margins and are sensitive to fluctuations in the demand for their services. If
they have the political power to decide policy within the profession, if they are running
the Law Society, they may well use that power to focus on policies which will stabilize
the market for their services, such as limiting the annual intake into the profession,
competitive advertising and the growing trend to specialization. Conversely, benchers
who come from elite firms are more likely to focus on measures which reinforce their
particular version of professional status and privilege. Since they handle large sums of
money, they may well emphasize, say, policing measures which will reassure the public
about lawyers' honesty. Since they offer sophisticated services to discerning and
affluent clients, and can afford more training and the pursuit of higher credentials, they
may favour compulsory examinations to achieve and enforce higher standards of
competence.
I am not condemning either group. Understandably each will imagine that its version
of lawyering is the norm, that its own interests exactly coincide with those of the
profession and the public. However, there is a lot more to the politics of professional
governance than self-delusion and self-aggrandizement. A great deal turns upon
predominant understandings about the profession's long-term collective interests.
What collective interests? First example: autonomy is widely considered to be an
important collective goal for the bar, a goal thought to be threatened by adverse
publicity and a loss of public trust. Consequently, the profession tends to focus on those
violations of the ethical code which are believed likely to undermine public trust and
thus to threaten professional autonomy. Lawyers who cheat on their legal aid bills
would fall into this category. To take another example, professional solidarity is thought
by some to be an important factor in maintaining the profession's privileges.
Consequently, lawyers who are perceived to undermine professional traditions of
dignity and deference - individuals who are brash, for example, or who espouse
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radical views about the legal system action.

are liable to be the targets of disciplinary

My point is a simple one. The profession is not monolithic. It contains a number of
sub-groups with interests, opinions, activities and styles which are not identical and
indeed which are sometimes antagonistic. Which of these groups happens at any
moment to control the definition and enforcement of the ethical code determines what
kinds of offences are likely to be regarded as serious enough to be prosecuted. And
since various offences are obviously more pertinent to some kinds of practices than to
others, ultimately this means that whoever controls policy-making within the profession
also effectively determines which types of lawyers will be regarded as creating
discipline problems. Finally, since the demographics of different sectors within the
profession vary considerably, discipline will ultimately fall unequally not only on
different kinds of practitioners, but on members of different generations, classes,
ethnicities, races and genders. That is what I mean by the "ethical economy" of the
profession.
I hope no one imagines that I am saying anything controversial. Serious inequalities
have been well-documented in family structures, schools and universities, the criminal
justice system and the job market. Giving full credit to the bar for recent progress, and
rumours of progress, it would be truly startling if perfect equality of opportunity or
equality of respect existed within the legal profession itself. All I am saying is that
these inequalities are reflected in the distribution of individuals amongst different
sectors of practice, which are themselves sites of unequal degrees of temptation and
instruments of control, and which are liable to be treated with unequal degrees of
concern by those who generally preside over governing bodies and discipline
committees.
Where does all this come to rest? Professional discipline is most often imposed on
individuals who practice in small firms or alone. These individuals tend to be marginal
in some way: in terms of their academic records, or their sociological or psychological
profile. And periods of considerable disciplinary activity tend to track significant
downturns in the economy, especially those involving a collapse of the real estate
market. Recently, however, this familiar pattern has begun to change. In several highly
publicized cases, lawyers in elite firms, until now seldom the target of professional
discipline, have been found guilty of professional misconduct and even criminal
activity. I would like to use this development to test my hypothesis about the three
main determinants of professional conduct: personal characteristics, the context of the
individual's practice situation and the ethical economy of the profession.
First, personal characteristics. In at least a few of these cases, the individuals
involved were not main-line members of their particular elite firm. In some cases, they
had joined the firm only recently; in some they were from backgrounds not well
represented in the firm; in some their personal style marked them as somewhat deviant;
one way or another, most could indeed be described as marginal within the setting of
their firm. In other respects, however, they were actually typical members of the firm:
the very characteristics which made them attractive recruits and high billers - their
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intelligence, hard work and aggressive character - were also the characteristics which
enabled them to succeed in their misbehaviour, once they put their minds to it. Indeed,
precisely because they were intelligent, hard working, aggressive and successful, their
colleagues were probably reluctant at first to believe that they were acting improperly:
they just did not fit the stereotype of the deviant lawyer.
This leads me to the next factor: the nature of practice in elite firms during the
egregious eighties and the nasty nineties. Beginning in the sixties, and through to the
end of the eighties, elite firms expanded rapidly in size and, through mergers and
alliances, were able to dominate their particular client market more and more
completely. This market is populated by corporate and institutional clients who require
highly sophisticated, highly specialized and highly priced technical and strategic advice
and representation.
The elite firms were able, more or less, to satisfy these requirements, but they had
to transform themselves to do so. This is where they encountered difficulties. They
became more capital and knowledge intensive, divided themselves into more highly
specialized boutiques, and became more intimately involved in the business and
political aspects of their clients' affairs. Because of financial pressures, they also
became committed to a rate of expansion and diversification which exceeded the rate
at which they could absorb new recruits into the firm's informal "culture," or handle
new activities within existing protocols governing personnel practices, financial
arrangements and firm management.
Thus, elite firms sometimes lacked either the formal structures or the informal
understandings with which to control, coordinate and evaluate the loose aggregations
of individuals practicing under the umbrella of the firm name. These shortcomings especially the decline of a strong firm culture - became evident during the economic
crisis of the late eighties, when firm members came under terrific pressure to maintain
the revenues needed to meet the financial obligations and expectations of partners,
associates, employees, bankers and landlords. Under such pressure, marginal individuals
were tempted or driven to take desperate measures and the customary intra-firm devices
failed to deter or detect them. That, at least, is one hypothesis.
The other hypothesis - and I have to say it is equally tenable - is that misconduct
of all kinds has always been as common in elite firms as elsewhere in the profession;
what has changed is that it can no longer be concealed. This brings me to the third
factor: the ethical economy of the profession.
I admit freely that what follows is very Ontario-centric, if that is not an oxymoron.
However, let me advance the following proposition. Until ten or fifteen years ago the
legal profession operated pretty much as a closed corporation. The governing body was
dominated by lawyers from elite firms, abetted by leading counsel and members of the
local gentry from around the province. Policy-making was largely tacit and discipline
operated pretty much in secret. In such a context, the elite firms could count on being
left to police themselves. They, in turn, held their members to standards which were at
least as strict as those prevailing in the profession generally. When firm members
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occasionally committed defalcations or other forms of misconduct, the firm dealt with
the offender and the offence on a confidential basis, rather than through the formal
discipline procedures of the Law Society.
Now, however, the Law Society is run on a different basis. Increased stratification
of the profession, demographic changes in the membership of the governing body,
public pressure for more openness and accountability, improvement of accounting
systems, increases in the sums being dealt with, greater aggressiveness by more
sophisticated corporate clients, declining deference towards respected institutions across
society: all these and other forces combined to ensure that the elite firms would be
drawn more and more into the orbit of formal regulation, and once in that orbit, would
no longer be treated in a privileged fashion.
In fact, the real significance of recent experience is this: the Law Society's handling
of misbehaviour in elite firms came to be seen as the ultimate test of the profession's
moral right to regulate itself. As a result of bad judgments by the firms themselves,
delays in the discipline process, obfuscatory explanations and light penalties, the Law
Society came near to failing this test, at least from a public point of view. From the
point of view of the membership of the Society, these cases served both to illuminate
and exacerbate tensions within the profession which were and are moving down fault
lines of generation, geography and gender, of economics, politics and culture, and
especially of knowledge, expertise and professional specialization.
I offer as a final example the crisis over competence now being experienced by the
profession. As I have suggested, competence was essentially not on our agenda at all
until the 1970s. In 1974, however, the CBA adopted its new Code of Professional
Conduct which did indeed establish a "duty to be competent":2 does this not prove that
such codes make a difference? Such a conclusion, I would argue, is a classic instance
of the post hoc, propter hoc fallacy. The 1974 Code - and I was one of its authors was not the cause of a professional crisis over competence; it was an effect.
Causes have to be found elsewhere. The most obvious is the profession's experience
with malpractice insurance. Partly as a referred result of rising malpractice claims in
the United States, malpractice insurance became pretty much universal in Ontario
during the 1960s. In the early 1970s, it became mandatory; and as soon as it became
mandatory, the Law Society had to step in initially to define the terms of coverage, then
to negotiate premiums and finally to act as a self-insurer. Thus, the governing body for
the first time acquired a direct stake in the costs and consequences of incompetence.
For this reason, it had a strong motivation to contain rising costs, and this it did (as
did other Law Societies) by attempting to reduce the incidence of claims. As premiums
continued to escalate, various forms of intervention were proposed and instituted:
improved educational programs, practice advisory services, mandatory continuing

Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,
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education, certification of specialists, mandatory re-certification of all lawyers and so
forth.
Rising premium costs and rising levels of intervention by the Law Society in turn
had an important effect on the behaviour of law firms.. Some of these were obvious and
desirable: firms introduced new control systems to catch procedural lapses;
subspecialties emerged within and amongst firms to ensure that appropriate levels of
expertise were available in exotic areas of practice; in-firm training, education and
research functions were expanded. Now, a second wave of effects is emerging: the cost
of malpractice insurance is rising so sharply that it has begun to materially affect
operating costs, profit levels and perhaps even the ability of small firms to survive. As
a consequence, sectors of the bar which generate the least claims, such as criminal
lawyers, are rebelling against having to pay premiums which, in effect, subsidize
sectors such as conveyancing, which generate the most.
In other words, the new concern with competence has set in motion powerful
economic and political forces within the profession. But these forces are virtually
unconcerned with the 1974 changes in the Code of Professional Conduct. Indeed, the
competence crisis has very little to do with any aspect of professional ethics. Rather,
in my view, it results from profound changes in the nature of law as an intellectual
discipline, as a profession and as a socio-economic and political phenomenon.
III. CONCLUSION
A few concluding notes, in no particular order: As law has become more and more
the regulatory instrument of the interventionist state, it has become more detailed and
complex. As it has become more detailed and more complex, the risks of error have
grown exponentially. Further, it is not just law in the juridical sense which has changed.
Many of the things lawyers are being called on to do involve an understanding of what
lies underneath the rules, what is the social and political context of the rules, what
likelihood there is of someone - including the client - securing a change in the rules,
and what implications the rules have for the business interests or personal well-being
of the client. The advice-giving function of lawyers has become infinitely more
complex and so has the representational function, especially since the advent of the
Charter.3 Again, opportunities for malpractice proliferate.
All of this means that the knowledge base of the contemporary lawyer must be both
broader and deeper than that of previous generations but also that it must constantly be
purged, renewed and expanded. This is particularly hard to accomplish since law has
been slow in emerging as an intellectual discipline and still lacks a rigorous base of
fundamental knowledge comparable to other social sciences, let alone the natural
sciences. The absence of this knowledge base has led to the absence of standard texts
built on agreed foundational assumptions, which in turn has led to the absence of
standard procedures which might calibrate competence in particular fields of law. The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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absence of an agreed knowledge base is by no means entirely negative: it contributes
to widely varied and far-ranging debate in legal academic discourse. However, it
certainly does exacerbate the difficulty of preparing lawyers to deal with a rapidly
changing and expanding body of legal knowledge in such a way as to minimize the
risks of errors and of malpractice claims.
To restate and expand my fundamental point: the crisis of competence being
experienced by the legal profession today is only marginally related to the 1974
to
changes in the Code of Professional Conduct, or to Law Society policies designed
and
enforce the new Code or to reduce malpractice claims through more training
testing. Rather, it is a reflection of fundamental changes in the very nature of law in our
our
society, in the foundational understandings of legal intellectual work, and in
and
education
inability, so far, to address problematic aspects of our system of legal
training.
To conclude with excerpts from the rich Pythonian lexicon: this parrot of selfchoir
regulation is definitely deceased; it is pushing up the daisies; it has joined the
invisible; it is bereft of life; it has met its maker; it is no more; it is bleeding demised.

